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The Laboratory of Experimental Economics was created in 199 1 within the Department of 
Economics of the University of Trento. Its initial purpose was to conduct experiments in 
analysis of organizational behaviour - which is still its principal area of interest although 
others have recently been added, most notably study of the formation of choice behaviour in 
demand for consumer goods and decision-making in the fiscal and distributive area. 
The original idea was to develop models of 'organizational learning' which describe the 
growth of organizational and informational structures in firms and institutions, and to conduct 
analysis and empirical verification utilizing recent techniques developed in the field of 
Experimental Economics. This purely experimental work is now flanked by analysis in the 
theoretical area of the organization and the firm. Particular emphasis has been placed on the 
development of models of information structures in firms and on the representation and 
simulatipn of the multi-actor decision processes that unfold within them, at the managerial 
and planning level and also from the point of view of consensus formation. 
The work of the Laboratory has fully borne out the decision to conduct research from 
three different disciplinary points of view: (a) that of the cognitive sciences, in order to 
deepen understanding of learning processes by means of laboratory experiments and in order 
to model the knowledge transfer mechanisms that characterize organizational learning; (b) 
that of the theory of decision support for the understanding and formulation of the preferences 
leading to the decision: (c) that of organizational analysis in order to study the emergence of 
different forms of cooperation and the solution of cognitive and decisional conflicts. (d) that 
of institutional economics, to move into the direction of explaining the rise of economic 
institutions on the basis of new micro-foundations. 
One indirect aim of the project is to develop a research agenda in a coordinate way with 
various groups sharing the same methodological approach. Among these groups several 
Italian universities are involved (C i  Bembo at Venice, Political Science at Turin, the 
University of Genoa, the Bocconi University of Milan, the Universities of Modena and 
Trento). The Laboratory is also cooperating in systematic manner with a number of 
international research centres, in particular with the following groups: BACH (University of 
Michigan), CSOM (University of Amsterdam), Dynamics of Computation Group (Palo Alto), 
SCANCOR (Stanford University), CCE (University of California, Los Angeles). 
The Laboratory gratefully acknowledge the support received from The University of 
Trento ("Progetto Speciale") and The Italian Ministry of University and Research ("MURST" 
40%). 
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1. Why revisit the "Creative Destruction" 
One of the analytical advantages brought by transaction costs economics has been to provide a 
general framework within one can consider all economic organizations as displayed in a 
"space" of different contractual forms between the two extreme situations of pure markets and 
pure hierarchies. Even though this approach is still incomplete and characterized by 
unresolved problems I ,  it has consolidated the idea of considering market and hierarchical 
organizations to be alternative devices with which to coordinate economic activities. This idea 
originates from the debate on socialist planning to which during the 1930s Lange (among 
socialists) and Hayek (among Austrians) made the major contributions. The Austrian claims 
concerning the inefficiency of planning created a dilemma in the neo-classical camp because 
capitalistic business firm are basically planned organizations, and therefore large and giant 
firms should be expected to be poorly efficient. Coase's notion of transaction costs can be 
considered a reply to the dilemma opened by the Austrian: in fact in his view planned 
organizations exist because the costs to coordinate the economic activities via markets are 
positive and can be higher than the costs to coordinate them via plans and orders. 
Transaction costs are therefore introduced as the costs of "running the market", and is 
suggested that the limit on the expansion of planned organizations is reached when the costs 
of organizing economic activity by orders within a plan become superior to the costs of 
organizing the same activity via transactions on the market. (the so-called of make-or-buy 
decision). 
In its earlier versions, by consequence, transaction costs economics focused on vertical 
integration as the basic mechanism with which to explain the shift among different 
organizational forms. In current debate the perspective has widened: markets, firms and 
hybrid forms which characterize economic activity, are considered to be different "governance 
structures of transactions" (Williamson, 1981) and the differences among different forms are 
analysed by comparing the attributes of transactions with the features of the governance 
structures, and also the costs involved. Yet, even in this more sophisticated version, this 
approach requires precise definition and operationalization of the concept of transaction costs: 
a task which, despite the large amount of theoretical and empirical work devoted to it, still has 
not been fully accomplished.2 
One of the reasons for this difficulty seems to be an incomplete analysis of the nature of 
the human decisions involved in the make-or-buy choice: in fact, the contours of the areas of 
economic activities covered respectively by markets and by hierarchies depend on the 
outcome of decisions "rationally" taken by managers of the firm: but managerial decisions 
may have highly unintended consequences, because of the limits on the human rationality. 
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Analysis of alternative possible lines of action and the computation of costs involved 
(whatever their definition) are normally largely incomplete, and this feature is amplified when 
decisions are innovative. 
In consequence, since managerial activities display unintended effects in the long run, 
we cannot take it for granted that the level of transaction costs will perfectly discriminate 
between market and planned activities. Therefore it is possible that an institution (market, 
hierarchical organization or hybrid) will remain locked in a highly sub-optimal configuration 
without the "spontaneous" rise of an alternative institution to render coordination more 
efficient. This suggest a vision of the economy which is somewhat more pessimistic, but also 
more realistic, than that entailed by full use the transaction costs theory: this approach in fact 
implies that the distribution between economic activities undertaken respectively via markets 
and via planned organizations is optimal, thereby becoming philosophically close to Spinoza's 
thesis that we live in the best of the possible worlds. 
The suspicion that institutions are not perfectly self-regulating clashes with a long- 
standing tradition in economics. Since the parable of the Invisible Hand, the market has been 
depicted as a self-regulating institution, efficient by virtue of competition, which allows social 
benefits to be achieved despite individual egoism. Smith' evocative image fails to take 
account of the possibility of the long-run undesired effects of boundedly rational egoistic 
behaviour on economic institutions. Even though a glance at any historical example of the 
economic redistribution of wealth and resources confirms the existence of negative effects, 
only recently, with the rise of the theory of the adverse selection and market failure, has the 
myth of the market as a mechanism which always leads to optimal resource allocation been 
seriously challenged. 
The idea of the possible failure and decadence of markets has been advanced in works 
by Arrow (1971) and Akerlof (1970). The former points out that in economic contexts 
characterised by systematic innovative (inventive) activity, conditions of the imperfect 
appropriability and appraisability of the new goods hold, and in consequence the market fails 
to achieve optimal resource allocation. Imperfect appraisability, as Akerlof showed, is also the 
key condition which can lead to the decline of a market and its disappearance. 
The point is that the decline of the market, and eventually its disappearance, does not 
automatically lead to the rise of an alternative institution which enables the system to achieve 
optimality: Akerlof's analysis suggests that the mechanism of competition, which is expected 
to select "virtuously" the most competent behaviours, may be superseded by a "vicious" 
mechanism of adverse selection which discourages the emergence of efficient and competent 
behaviours. 
My contention is that if a contractual system does not allocate optimally, this does not 
imply that it will possible for an alternative contractual system to emerge, consequently the 
economy may remain trapped in a highly sub-optimal condition. 
To test the implications of this assumption the first step is to examine under what 
conditions the forces fostering or preventing the efficient working of market are active, and if 
they work in different institutional contexts. To do this we must establish whether it is 
possible to transfer the idea of the virtuous effect of competition from its natural environment, 
the market, to hierarchical systems. And secondly we must clarify whether the same holds for 
"adverse" mechanisms, i.e. whether corresponding to market failure mechanisms is some 
form of organizational failures within hierarchies. 
We must first revisit the notion of competition, in order to clarify the conditions for the 
failure of its virtuous effects. How competition works, in fact, is not a fully agreed upon by 
the different schools of economic thought. The notion has been formulated in at least three 
different ways. 
First we have the standard neo-classical description of competition as leading the 
economic system to equilibrium and allowing an optimal resource allocation. Beyond this 
view, which addresses the question of computability, stability and Pareto optimality in 
conditions of perfect knowledge, a more subtle issue is raised by the Austrian approach to 
competition: that of the emergence of markets as institutions in conditions of dispersed and 
divided knowledge. Hayek attributed a quite different feature to competition than did standard 
neoclassical theory: namely its capacity to discover better ways to use economic resources by 
allowing the more competent and efficient behaviours to prevail. 
A third description of competition is offered by the Schumpeter's Creative Destruction. 
Even though couched in term very similar to the Austrians', by emphasizing the emergence of 
innovative behaviours as individualistic, 'heroic' actions, Schumpeter suggested that also 
these behaviours could be standardized, that competition could consequently decline and be 
replaced by bureaucratic planned activity. For reasons I shall explore later, Schumpeter's 
prophecy of an historical, long-run decline of market competition was not fulfilled; one reason 
for this failure being that, while he suggested that the incentives of market competition were 
destined to weaken, he assumed it as natural that bureaucratized organizations would be able 
to create a system of incentives more effective than the market's: which historically did not 
happen." 
Although Schumpeter's predictions have not been fulfilled, his analysis conducts 
important historical comparison of the relative performances of two economic institutions 
which sheds light on the possibility that competition can fail and market system can 
disappear. For reasons which I will clarify later, Creative Destruction is not a simple 
extension of the Austrian's view of competition as a virtuous mechanism; it also contains also 
the idea of adverse selectiolz. Competition, in Shumpeter's view, is primarily a process of the 
creation and diffusion of new knowledge within the economic system under conditions of 
rivalry; a process which has important re-allocative effects and, reinterpreted with current 
analytical tools, presumes conditions of market failure. 
The argument set out in the following pages, therefore, is that this process works in an 
environment of market failures and externalities where Hayekian "virtuous" selection and 
adverse selection operate jointly in dynamic equilibrium. Confirmation of this feature of 
Creative Destruction is provided by the theory of democracy expounded in the second part of 
Capitalism Socialism and Democracy. Schumpeter did not provide explicitly micro- 
foundations for his analysis of Creative Destruction, but most of the essential elements for a 
micro-foundation of human behaviour in economics and politics are contained in his theory of 
democracy. 
This part of his analysis is in fact based on the idea of bounded rationality, cognitive 
inertia and the limited ability of humans to evaluate information relevant to political 
decisions: on the one hand these assumptions are crucial to Schumpeter's theory insofar they 
permit the representation of political institutions as based on delegation, trust and leadership; 
on the other, they are strikingly "Austrian" and easily extendible to economics. It is important 
to note that the assumption that human decisions are affected by limits in using rationality and 
processing information cannot be restricted to the context of political institutions; and in fact 
Schumpeter points out that the only difference between the nature of decisions in political and 
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economic contexts is the extent of the knowledge base, i.e. the competence area of consumers 
and producers, which in economics is normally broader than in politics. 
In his theory of democracy Schumpeter describes a process which in modern terms can 
called as a process of adverse selection in politics, based on the assumption that bounded 
rationality, asymmetry of information and opportunism characterize human behaviour. As I 
have suggested, these three features are not specific to human behaviours in politics, but they 
are also valid in economic contexts. Therefore Schumpeter's theory of democracy and his 
theory of Creative Destruction can be regarded as based on an unified theoretical background. 
At the same time his theory of democracy allows us to explore to what extent the modern idea 
of adverse selection can be used beyond its original sphere of application, the economic 
theory of market failure, to describe organizational and political failures and to gain better 
understanding of the limits of hierarchical organizations. 
Summing up, we started from the observation that if markets are be trapped in a sub- 
optimal configuration, an alternative, more efficient way to coordinate economic activities 
will not necessarily emerge. One possible reason is that transaction costs are not fully 
computable, because of the unintended effects of economic decisions, and therefore a more 
efficient contractual set-up may fail to emerge. Instead of appealing to transaction costs, this 
paper suggests a different approach to the problem based on identification of the forces which 
lead to the rise and the fall of the different coordination devices. It explores the possibility of 
re-interpreting the meaning of the competition on the one hand, and that of adverse selection 
on the other, as selective mechanisms which give rise, respectively, to the prevalence of 
competent and loyal behaviours over the opportunistic ones, or vice-versa, in the markets and 
within hierarchical organizations. Schumpeter's theory of democracy and his theory of 
Creative Destruction can be used as benchmarks with which to verify the appropriateness of 
this approach and as a suitable basis for analysis of the rise and the fall of different 
organizational and contractual contexts. 
The paper is organized follows way: the different features of competition are analyzed 
and compared, beginning with the debate on planning and socialism, in the first three sections. 
Then the possible extension of adverse selection to hierarchies, and its relation to 
Schumpeterian Creative Destruction are discussed (sections 4 ,5 ,  6). In the last sections the 
Schumpeterian theory of democracy is revised in relation to adverse and virtuous political 
selection, and links are examined with Creative Destruction. 
2. Walras-Barone: Competition as the Computability of equilibrium in 
Planned and Market Economies 
The debate on the feasibility of a collectivist planned economy began in the early years of this 
century with the appearance on the European political scene of parties inspired by socialism 
as an ideology and a political Utopia. The problem was to answer to the question whether a 
socialist (collectivist) economic system based on the public ownership of the means of 
production and on planning could work. The controversy in part took the form of a clash 
between the two rival economic camps of neoclassical theory and Marxian theory, but this 
contrast seemed to loose much part of its relevance when it was claimed by Pareto first, and 
then definitively by Barone, that a planned economy can be treated with the analytical tools of 
general economic equilibrium theory, and in consequence that it was possible formally to 
prove the workability of a planned economy; that is, the viability of the 'pure logic of 
socialism' and particularly the existence of equilibrium in planned economies. Barone 
employed the Walrasian model to give formal demonstration of the fact that equilibrium can 
exist in a planned economic system. However, he failed to show how this equilibrium could 
be computed in the absence of the market.4 
His position therefore implicitly assumes that the distributed and unconscious 
computation of equilibrium performed in the markets by the 'invisible hand' can be replaced 
by calculation performed directly and consciously by some alternative institution within 
planned organizations; that is, by what we may call the 'Central Planning Office'. This raises 
the question of whether a (presumably huge) bureaucracy can replace market mechanisms and 
perform the calculation required to establish the levels of supply and demand for all goods and 
services, by planning their production. Transfer of the Walrasian model to the context of 
planning is not 'natural', as it happens. Assuming that it is possible to prove the existence of 
an equilibrium in a planned economy with the same analytical tools that general equilibrium 
theory provides for market economies, is not clear what will substitute for competition 
mechanisms within planned economic systems, in relation to the degree of decentralisation of 
information, knowledge and computation, and the incentives system. 
This issue - whether or not a planned system could be made to work - provoked heated 
debate in the neoclassical school. The Austrian branch of the marginalist school, Menger, in 
particular, argued that planning was theoretically impossible, and claimed that the Plan Office 
could never possess all the knowledge and information required to calculate artificially what 
the market calculated 'naturally' via price movements. 
In the opposite camp, 0 .  Lange (1 937) responded to the impossibility argument with a 
model of socialist planning based on decentralised decision-making which seemed to settle 
the question in favour of the socialist position (Keizer 1994). And, in fact, some years inter in 
Capitalism Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter argued that not only was an artificial 
calculation entirely feasible, but the introduction of an extensive bureaucracy (apart from the 
problem of the degree of centralization) would render it more straightforward than was the 
case in a market economy. It would eliminate the decisional uncertainty created in market 
systems by the existence of a large number of subjects deciding independently (for example, 
small entrepreneurs competing in the same industry) and reduce unpredictability in 
managerial decisions (Schumpeter, 1942: 175). 
Hayek wrote a critical rejoinder to Schumpeter's position (Hayek, 1980: 90) in which he 
noted that Pareto himself, while suggesting that the problem of calculation was essentially the 
same in socialist and market economies, had sustained the practical impossibility of socialist 
calculation, due to the astronomically high number of equations that must be computed. 
The point at issue here is that Hayek's polemic against the possibility of a planned 
system to work as a market economy was not based solely on the complexity of economic 
calculation; he contended that, since a planned system lacked competition, the incentives that 
would ensure its efficient functioning were absent. 
'To assume that i t  is possible to create conditions of full competition without making those 
who are responsible for the decisions pay for their mistakes seems to be pure illusion' 
(Hayek 1980: 186) 
The crucial point is therefore that Hayek viewed the role of competition very differently from 
Walras, and that he raised reasons for the inefficiency of planning (as defined by Barone) that 
were much more relevant than the question of calculation complexity. 
See Hayek (1980: 90, note 1 )  and more generally 'Socialist Calculation 111: the Competitive "Solution" ' 
(pp 1 8 1-208). 
3. Hayek: Competition as a virtuous mechanism of selection 
Walras' model of competition as the equilibrium adjustment mechanism captured only some 
aspects of competition, a shortcoming of which the late-nineteenth-century economists were 
well aware. His model was contested by the Austrian school, which - mainly through Hayek - 
propounded a version of the notion of competition very different from the Walrasian one, by 
emphasizing two very different features of competition: selection and learning ones. 
The Austrian school's point of departure was a profound analysis of the nature of human 
reason and of its relationship with the social institutions; analysis which has no equivalent in 
Walrasian theory. Mises and Hayek stressed that human rationality and intelligence are 
characterized by strong cognitive limitations, and that individual knowledge is highly 
idiosyncratic. Individuals, they contended, develop skills, abilities and experience which are 
specific and personal; the role of the institutions is therefore to enable individuals with 
different skills and knowledge systems to interact, helping them to accomplish tasks which 
they would otherwise find impossible. 
Hayek criticised the economists of the Walrasian school because they took for granted 
what should instead be explained. They considered, that is, secondary importance, the 
problem of knowledge of by assuming relevant information and knowledge as available to 
everybody. 
'Clearly there is here a problem of division of knowledge which is quite analogous to, and 
at least as important as, the problem of the division of labour. But, while the latter has been 
one of the main subjects of investigation ever since the beginning of our science, the 
former has been as completely neglected, although it seems to me the really central 
probleln of economics as a social science. The problem which we pretend to solve is how 
the spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each possessing only bits of knowledge, 
brings about a state of affairs in which prices correspond to costs, etc., and which could be 
brought about by deliberate decision only by somebody who possessed the combined 
knowledge of all those individuals. 
Experience shows us that something of this sort does happen, since the empirical 
observation that prices do tend to correspond to costs was the beginning of our science. But 
in our analysis, instead of showing what bits of information the different persons must 
possess in order to bring about that result, we fall in effect back on the assumption that 
everybody knows everything and so evade any real solution of the problem.' 
(Hayek, 1980: 50-1) 
Since knowledge is idiosyncratic and personal, a key problem is determining how 
individuals discover the 'relevant information'. Hayek argued that it is not necessary for 
producers to conduct an exhaustive search for the knowledge they require, because the 
economic system provides signals which induce them only to seek the relevant knowledge. 
These signals are emitted by markets and are transmitted through prices. What markets do is 
to signal, through variations in costs and prices, the existence of inefficiencies within the 
economic system. This image of competition seems tailored to capture processes of 
distributed micro-innovation and innovation diffusion. If, for example, a group of innovators 
reduces the price of a certain good because they are able to produce it more efficiently, this 
price modification provides other producers with a very clear signal, and exerts strong 
pressure on them to adjust rapidly to the new mode of production. This is therefore a view - 
one shared by all the Austrians - which regards competition as a form of natural selection 
from which the best technologies, behaviours and organizational forms emerge. 
4. Schumpeter: Competition as Creative Destruction 
Schumpeter extended the Austrian argument to include the problem of the division of 
knowledge within the economy, and suggesting a model which combined selection and 
innovation. He argued that the engine of the (cyclical) process of development is the 
innovative activity undertaken by entrepreneurs when economic conditions are favourable (the 
low interest rates and low production factor costs which characterize depressions). Successful 
innovation activity reduces the costs and prices of goods and hence obliges all producers to 
adjust rapidly. Otherwise they are negatively selected and forced out of the market. 
In his view too, economic development proceeds through a sequence of innovation-imitation 
in which competition acts selectively. This Schumpeter called the process of Creative 
Destruction: 
'Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition was all 
they saw. As soon as quality competition and sales effort are admitted in the sacred 
precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its dominant position. However, it is 
still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, method of production and 
forms of industrial organization in particular, that practically monopolizes attention. 
Rut in capitalistic reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, i t  is not the kind of 
competition which counts but the competition for the new commodity, the new technology, 
the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of control for 
instance) - competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which 
strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms, but at their 
foundations and at their very lives.' 
(Schumpeter, 1942: 85) 
This position reverses the order of the Walrasian account. The convergence of prices to 
levels which ensure equilibrium between supply and demand - the central component of 
Walras' theory - is regarded as of secondary importance. The main problem, Schumpeter 
contends, is that of competition as a selective procedure which singles out the best mode of 
production. So, even if declaredly a great admirer of Walras' general equilibrium approach, 
Schumpeter fully incorporated into his theory the competition features focused upon by the 
Austrians: learning (innovation), selection and (profit) incentives play a fundamental role in 
the picture. 
What was not clear in Hayek's vision, namely the fact that competition does not lead to 
(static) optimal resource allocation, but to a dynamic re-allocation of resources, becomes 
evident in Schumpeter's analysis: he views competition as giving rise to the continuous 
redistribution of resources and wealth among individuals, expelling those found to be unfit 
from the market. Competition creates and destroys fortunes, jobs and wealth, and therefore is 
the fundamental source of the rise and decline of economic institutions. In contrast to this 
clear statement of competition's features within markets, Schumpeter did not attribute any 
particular importance to the existence of similar features within bureaucratic organizations. 
Unfortunately, this is one of the central points for comparison between the performances 
of market and planned organizations - and ultimately with which to respond to the historical 
debate with which we started: whether a collectivist economic system, in which competition 
has been eliminated and replaced by planning, can achieve the same performance and the 
same results as a market economy. Central here are the two functions of competition: market 
clearing, the function stressed by the Walrasian school, and that of incentivating producers to 
be as efficient as possible, the Austrian school's thesis. If the price mechanism is replaced by 
a hierarchical command system by means of which bureaucrats implement their centralized 
plan, what happens to the two functions fulfilled by competition in markets? 
Regarding the first function, that of market clearing, Schumpeter asserts that it is highly 
likely that bureaucrats can perform the calculations required for planning, thereby substituting 
for the perfect competition mechanism and proving in practice that it can be done. He paid 
scant attention to competition's second function, that of producing a system of incentives able 
to reduce opportunistic behaviour; or at least he assumes that a change of mental habits would 
be possible in bourgeois environment which generated symbolic incentives (like the rewards 
and honours in the army) able to produce efficiency within a bureaucracy in the same way that 
economic incentives do in market economies. 
5. Adverse selection, virtuous selection : is market a self-repairing 
institution? 
According to the Austrian school, it was competition that gave efficiency to the economic 
system through a process of selection. What seems to have escaped their analysis are the 
limits of competition, and the consequences which arise when competition fails to have 
beneficial effects. This happens, as adverse selection and moral hazard analysis illustrate, 
when the appropriability and appraisability of assets and goods traded does not hold. 
Appraisability: to be certain that a new good satisfies their requirements, purchasers 
must be able to evaluate its possible uses. But this they can only do once they have purchased 
the good. This entails that purchasers are unable to know the uses of, and therefore to attribute 
a value to, the good that they buy, except ex post. Moreover, appraisability requires 
competence, which is not uniformly distributed among consumers. This is particularly evident 
with innovations and inventions, which, like all goods containing knowledge, are not perfectly 
appraisable. 
Appropriability: a good is said to be appropriable when it is possible to make exclusive 
use of it. The reasons why inventions are largely non-appropriable rest on the particular 
features of knowledge as a good: despite the division of labour, there is a broad overlapping of 
knowledge and competences among producers in the same industry. They all share a common 
knowledge-base, which market it possible to imitate inventions, by reproducing them, without 
incurring all the costs of research and development that the first inventor has to sustained. The 
weakness or absence of these two characteristics - appropriability and appraisability - may 
markedly reduce the size of the market of inventions (Arrow, 1983). As a consequence, 
resources may be allocated non-optimally and the economic system may grow at a rate less 
than its potential. Inappropriability and non-valuability are key factors in enabling selection to 
function in an either favourable or adverse manner. The reasons for this I now examine. If we 
assume that the appraisability of a good is imperfect, the buyer may be 'sold a lemon' by the 
seller, who may assure him that the good possesses the desired qualities although this is not 
actually the case. 
Opportunistic behaviour arises which may discourage or prevent the transaction. The 
certainty that the good's declared qualities correspond to its actual ones is only guaranteed by 
the fact that there exist endogenous conditions which incentivate producers not to behave 
opportunistically. These conditions have been highlighted by game theory: if the two parties 
to a contract expect the exchange to be repeated in the future, for a large number of times 
which are not known a priori, each of them will be incentivated to behave correctly, thereby 
acquiring a good reputation. In this case it becomes convenient to keep to agreements; 
otherwise it is always possible that those who have been dissatisfied with their partner's 
behaviour will turn to a more able and more honest one. Hence Hayekian competition is 
effective in the case of 'large numbers' and low barriers to entry in which the selection 
process favours the best.When this does not happen, opportunistic behaviour may appear and 
as consequence a process of adverse selection may arise. In examination of how virtuous 
Hayekian and adverse selection are interrelated, I cite, as a celebrated example, Akerlof's 
analysis (1970) of the market for lemons. Let us suppose that there is a used-car market in 
which every individual seller wishes to sell his car privately. 
In order to evaluate the quality of the good correctly, the buyer must consult an expert 
mechanic, and therefore sustain what may be high costs. The buyer may have to pay for the 
mechanic's expertise several times before he finds a car of good quality. This means that the 
average cost to be borne in finding the desired car may exceed the difference between the 
value of a well-maintained car and the value of one in an average state of repair; and this is a 
cost which no buyer is willing to sustain. Consequently, since the buyer is uncertain of the 
quality of the good, he tends to value it cautiously and offers a price appropriate to an 
average-quality car, although the car is actually of good quality. The dealer offering the best 
good, i.e. the u cll-maintained car, is discouraged because he is unable to obtain a price that 
matches the quality of the good. This is therefore a process of adverse selection in which the 
best commodities are forced out of the market and the more able producers are 
disincentivated. 
A 'negative externality' effect also arises. If, despite everything, the sellers of good- 
quality cars remain in the market, resources are redistributed in favour of sellers of 'lemons', 
because they are able to earn more than the real value of the good, while the honest dealers 
earn less than this value. This is therefore a process of adverse selection which eliminates the 
good 'well-maintained car'. There is consequently a strong incentive against the habit of 
maintaining one's car in good condition. What, then, are the conditions which give rise to 
adverse selection, and those which lead to Hayekian selection? 
The key point in the above example is the possibility that the less well-informed parties 
to the contract may correctly evaluate, directly or indirectly, the quality of the good that 
interests them, and at reasonable cost. If, in the market described above, in which one private 
individual sells to another, there appears a dealer who manages to build up a large clientele by 
providing car appraisals backed by guarantees, this sets up a virtuous circle again. Knowing 
that buyers are willing to pay an above-average price for good-quality cars, and that this 
quality can be guaranteed by a reputable dealer, car-owners are once again incentivated to 
keep their cars in good condition. The dealer in this case is an innovative entrepreneur, who 
may assume the costs of hiring an expert mechanic to appraise cars because he divides these 
costs among a large number of cars bought and sold. This the private buyer is unable to do. 
Note that a new institutional figure - namely the dealer - is required in order to restore 
the virtuous mechanism of favourable selection which the market alone could not guarantee. 
This figure arises 'spontaneously' because the conditions are right for him to do so. In fact, 
adverse selection prevails over favourable selection because of the high cost of appraising 
goods. The trader's solution is to distribute these costs among a large number of goods sold. 
The question therefore becomes the following: is it always possible for institutions 
'spontaneously' to arise - which permit Hayekian competition to exert its virtuous effect - or 
are there situations in which the forces of competition are unable to accomplish their 
favourable effect and the economic system remains trapped in an sub-optimal configuration? 
The case of the market for inventions examined by Arrow provides an outstanding example of 
a situation in which the market is unable to self-regulate itself through the 'spontaneous' 
emergence of the institutions necessary to ensure its efficient functioning. 
In contrast to Akerlof's example, in this case it is impossible for a new institutional 
figure to emerge spontaneously; a new agent able to resolve the problem created by the failure 
of the market for inventions. Let us imagine that a private individual, an agent, assumes the 
task of selling inventions; to do this, he must defend the interests of inventors and purchasers. 
However, although he can protect purchasers by guaranteeing the quality of the invention that 
they buy, he cannot with the same means protect the inventors. In fact, he cannot prevent the 
onset of opportunistic behaviour - that is, the appearance of copiers or imitators - unless he 
decides to resort to coercive measures against imitators. For this to happen, every individual 
must be able to enforce respect for agreements by the private use of violence; only in this case 
can agents spontaneously arise to protect inventors against violations, by means of a private 
police system, mercenaries or the like. 
However, the fact that it is possible to make private use of violence in order to enforce 
agreements implies that there is the possibility to use private violence to enforce any kind of 
right: by consequence there does not exist a system of universally shared and accepted laws 
protecting rights by means of a legitimate Central Government with the monopoly of coercive 
measures. Hayekian competition may therefore function to its fullest extent only in the 
absence of a legitimate monopoly of violence able to enforce a set of universally accepted 
human rights. Therefore, if there exists a Central Government which is the legitimate 
monopoly-holder of violence, and which is assigned the role of enforcing respect for the rules 
ensuring that markets function (all the rules, not just those which concern respect for 
commitments undertaken in relation to exchange but also those protecting property rights), 
this means that there are breaches of the rules of the market which are not corrected by 
Hayekian competition. The market is therefore not a self-enforcing institution able 
autonomously to generate all the forces necessary for its efficient functioning. This is 
especially apparent in the defence of property rights of assets and goods which are only 
partially appropriable or valuable, and in particular inventions. In order to protect inventors, 
the guarantee of an authority external to the market, namely, the state, is required. The patents 
office is an economic institution whose existence rests on a force external to the market: the 
guarantee offered by the state that it will enforce the law. Its failure to do so will allow 
opportunism and adverse selection to prevail, thereby severely restricting the size of the 
inventions market. 
6. The Creative Destruction and missing market 
I have stressed the phenomenon of market failures, and in particular of situations in which, 
because competition cannot operate virtuously, some markets disappear and the market 
system is therefore unable to allocate resources optimally. Interestingly, this phenomenon 
arises within the process of Creative Destruction. In fact, as this process unfolds, the 
innovations market is not created to its fullest extent. In Schumpeter's description, after the 
success of the first inventors, a swarm of imitators arises to diffuse innovations throughout the 
system. There is nothing to say that these imitators will purchase patents from the innovators; 
indeed, opportunistic behaviour will predominate because most innovations cannot be easily 
protected. This gives rise to the transfer of unpaid-for resources from the innovators to the 
imitators. The cyclical process of development is therefore highly sub-optimal, because it 
cannot ensure full recompense for innovators. Nevertheless, sub-optimal recompense is 
sufficient to trigger the process and to finance the growth of innovative firms. Here, 
favourable selection and adverse selection operate simultaneously, and the former 
dynamically prevails over the latter. 
Creative Destruction is a virtuous process of competition because it improves the 
economy by enabling the best modes of production, the best working practices, etc., to 
emerge. But innovators are discouraged by the difficulty of protecting the results of their 
efforts, and by the impossibility of earning long-term profits from their innovations. If they 
were able to prevent their rivals from gaining access to their innovations, they could secure a 
permanent source of profits (technically, a rent) for themselves. But this privileged situation 
might become permanent, thereby eliminating the key element of competition. 
In competitive capitalism, innovators are only temporarily successful in this endeavour: 
when innovations are first introduced, innovators are monopolists, because they are sole 
possessors of the innovation, but they are unable to prevent entry to the sector by imitators 
and hence the resurgence of competition. The outcome is therefore the paradoxical situation in 
which the easier it is for a swarm of imitators to appropriate the secrets of innovators without 
paying for them in full, the less costly becomes entry to the market and therefore the larger the 
number of competitors. This enables competition to deliver its beneficial effects: the diffusion 
of the innovation and the consequent improvement in the quality or price of goods. 
Schumpeterian competition operates so rapidly and effectively precisely because there exists a 
situation in which opportunistic behaviour can arise. However, such behaviour cannot exceed 
certain limits, for if innovators are unable to earn sufficient profits from their efforts, they are 
subject to a process of adverse selection which, by discouraging them, progressively reduces 
the size of the innovations market. 
To conclude: the market of innovations cannot develop as a self-regulated institution 
because is governed by an unstable dynamic relationship between the two processes of 
virtuous and adverse selection. Therefore if we move out of the comparative static context and 
assume evolutionary conditions, i.e. if we assume, as the natural environment of our 
discussion, Hayekian-Schumpeterian conditions in which the most important way to recreate 
profits and re-allocate resources is the distributed creation of new knowledge, we must 
recognize that the dynamic relationship between virtuous and adverse selection characterizes 
all innovative economies. From this viewpoint, asset specificity helps to explain the 
preference for long-term contractual forms when a new innovative project has to be realized: 
new firms created to realize innovative investments allow the growth of internal competences 
in a network of idiosyncratic knowledge, without requiring the full appraisability and 
valuability of the individual contributions to growth of common knowledge 
7. Virtuous and adverse selection within hierarchical organizations 
I have outlined some features and limits of the idea of innovation as a distributed process of 
creation and diffusion of knowledge via markets characterized by Creative Destruction. These 
limits suggest that a similar process (the creation and diffusion of knowledge) may occur 
within firms, perhaps in a more efficient way. 
A pre-condition for examination for the possible extension of the Creative Destruction 
mechanisms within organizations, is to provide a definition of competition - which is a 
typical feature of the firms in the market - also within firms. To phrase the matter in different 
terms, we must establish whether if the rivalry among individuals that typifies their 
unconscious and unplanned cooperation behaviour in the market still survives when 
individuals consciously cooperate within the same firm. 
The contractual approach helps us answer to this problem. Relationships among firms 
are regulated and limited by contracts which restrict the rights of individuals and their range. 
Williamson's fundamental transformation is a very clear and vivid illustration of this 
phenomenon: consider the situation that arises when several firms enter a joint agreement to 
develop different parts of an innovative project. In this case, long-term joint investments are 
established and constitute sunk costs which prevent the partners from breaking the contractual 
relationship. The more the joint relationship among partners is improved by the creation of 
complementary competences, the more difficult it becomes for rival competitors to enter the 
relationship and substitute for pre-existing partners. The same happens within large firms: the 
more workers, employees and managers develops idiosyncratic competences within the 
internal knowledge network of the organization, the more difficult it becomes for external 
competitors to substitute them. 
Therefore we may suggest that to 'residual rights' , - i.e. to the power of decisions not 
involved in the contractual relationship - it corresponds a 'residual power of competitionl."t 
follows that as assets specificity increases - within organizations or among firms involved in a 
lock-in process - so 'residual rights to compete' become increasingly restricted. In the 
extreme case, in a pure theoretical world of complete long-term contracts, we will arrive at a 
null competitive power because the vertical relationship is entirely reduced to bilateral 
monopolies. But this limiting case presumes full knowledge and unlimited computational 
power (to calculate rationally all contingencies of the contracts). 
Therefore, assuming a context of bounded rationality, we can say that to whatever 
extent vertical relationships are strengthened, some residual rights to compete still remain. 
This suggests that the features of the competitive process, which constitute the regulatory 
mechanism of the market, can be transferred from their 'natural' environment to the opposite 
economic contexts, the firm, and used to explain of the mechanisms governing large 
bureaucratic organizations. In fact rivalry among individuals within economic organizations, 
is regulated by an internal system of incentives which are (deliberately or unconsciously) 
designed to support the working of an internal competition. What I shall maintain in the next 
pages is therefore that competition within organizations and competition across markets are 
basically the same phenomenon, i.e. two different ways of converting rivalry into 'virtuous' 
economic effects. Yet these effects differ between the two institutions because of the large 
difference in their abilities to compensate people are damaged by the reallocative effects of 
shirking and innovation. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that if we represent the market realistically, i.e. as device 
for realizing plans and projects in a distributed way 6 ,  we can compare the two ways to 
innovate - the distributed and the centralized - in terms of the relative advantages that 
competition and adverse selections bring about in the different contexts. 
A crucial point is the limits on the efficiency of planned systems in realizing projectual 
activities. Projecting is in fact essentially a high-level problem solving activity, which 
normally require a top-down process of division of labour and delegation, and for this reason 
it is highly conjectural and uncertain. It therefore can be realized only if it is complemented by 
a bottom-up distributed micro-innovative activity, i.e. by the 'local' activity of adaptation and 
micro-innovation activated by the individuals cooperating in the realization of the project. 
In his pessimistic description of the declining opportunities for the bourgeoisie, 
Schumpeter attributed major importance to technological innovations by downgrading 
organizational adaptive innovations and imagining a future in which almost all innovative 
activity would be conducted in large laboratories within great planned firms. 
Schumpeter omitted to take serious account of organizational innovations because his 
image of entrepreneurial activity was essentially that of an individualistic 'heroic action'; not 
a distributed and competitive projecting activity. Innovation is a necessarily diffused process 
because of the distributed nature of knowledge creation, and organizational micro-innovations 
are the normal by-product of everyday activity within organizations. The division of 
knowledge, as Hayek stressed, is a phenomenon which derives inevitably from the limits of 
human intelligence and rationality; and it is precisely these limits which make full prediction 
and planning of discoveries and inventions impossible. Hence it follows that neither can 
opportunities to innovate be fully controlled by a centralized system, nor can their 
development be fully planned. 
Hart. in Williamson and Winter S.G. (1991). 
6~ important implication of this statement is that prices are signals not sufficient to coordinate the plans of 
different firms; a transfer of knowledge and information among them is normally needed. 
These limits on centralized planning reduce the advantages of great hierarchically- 
planned firms over networks of small firms, from the point of view of their capacity to react to 
change and to external challenges. This helps explain why Schumpeter's prophecy has not 
been fulfilled, taking into account the cognitive aspects of economic organizations. 
A complementary explanation requires consideration, one based on the observation that 
adverse selection can also operate within organizations. Schumpeter underestimated the fact 
that when planning replaces the market, the place of the Creative Destruction he envisaged as 
the fundamental mechanism in the competitive struggle among firms in the market is not 
replaced by a selective process operating with equally brutal efficiency within organizations, 
by incentivating managers and bureaucrats to direct their action efficiently and creatively 
towards achievement of the organization's goals. 
If we accept that the relationships within a large economic organization are regulated by 
internal competition, we must admit not only that a conflict of interests may arise among 
individuals but also, as Marris (1972, 1980) suggests, that the interests of a hierarchy of 
managers, bureaucrats and office-workers do not normally coincide with the interests of the 
owners, nor with those of the shareholders. 
If competition operated efficiently, the managers of a large firm would introduce 
appropriate organizational innovations, change procedures, methods and organizational rules, 
promote the most able workers up the hierarchy to achieve unanimously shared goals. But any 
'efficient' restructuring of the organizational set-up may alter the internal distribution of 
resources and power, by reducing managerial attributes and their discretionary power. 
There therefore may be strong resistance within a bureaucratized large firm against the 
rapid redefinition of its managers' roles and against change to the organizational procedures 
involved. This resistance may be viewed as one of the principal sources of inefficiency in 
large organizations, and interpreted in terms of the adverse selection mechanism. Following 
Hirschman (1970) and Simon (1991), loyalty is a fundamental element in the improvement of 
organizational compactness. 
Opportunism is not a 'natural' trait of human behaviour uniformly shared by 
individuals; it is a habit which can be reinforced or discouraged by the working of the 
institutions themselves. One way of discouraging opportunistic behaviour is to improve 
loyalty, which can be done by creating incentives within hierarchical systems, for example by 
guaranteeing career prospects and rewarding competent behaviour. But if individuals, 
employees and managers, are to be rewarded by a mechanism of competitive selection within 
an organization, their ability and fitness must be evaluated and controlled by able superiors; 
and evaluation and filtering are effective only if they are performed by an authority which is 
'accepted' by inferiors in the hierarchy, in the sense that they recognize the competence of the 
superiors. To some extent within hierarchy it operates a bottom up control, insofar inferiors 
evaluate the appropriateness of superior's decisions and commands. 
This happens mainly when cognitive and reallocative conflicts arise from any internal 
innovation - even the micro innovation during the everyday adaptive activity. Conflicting 
opinions must find a room: the "voice" (Hirschman) allow the most competent opinion to 
emerge. The parts can better recognise the reciprocal competence, if it is the case, by using the 
voice, and by consequence their decisions reinforce loyalty and identification. Only on this 
basis - the possibility to exert the voice option - conflicts of opinions and of interests can be 
resolved with the prevalence of the most competent position and can loyalty overcome 
opportunism. If on the contrary voice cannot receive attention, loyalty is not sufficiently 
improved, and the virtuous effects of competition can be overwhelmed by a mechanism of 
adverse selection, which can lead the organization toward a very sub-optimal "order" 
characterized by a strongly authoritarian and scarcely competent hierarchy (Egidi, 1994). This 
kind of explanation was not considered in Schumpeter's discussion of features of planned 
economies : but, if transferred to a different context, the political one, largely fits with 
Schumpeterian analysis of democracy. 
8. Cognitive foundations of Creative Destruction: leadership and 
manipulation of preferences 
I argued at the outset that one of the most important features of the theory of Creative 
Destruction is that it can be transferred from analysis of the economic institutions to that of 
the political institutions. Schumpeter accomplished this transfer by revising - in a manner as 
radical as it was surreptitious - the neoclassical theory of decision-making and of the 
formation of supply and demand. 
Mainstream microeconomics views the formation of supply and demand as the effect of 
the rational behaviour of perfectly informed and independent economic agents. No explicit 
hypotheses are formulated on the costs that sellers and buyers must sustain in order to acquire 
information. Without specifying who must pay information costs, it is assumed that 
consumers possess a complete picture of the goods available and that, moreover, they are able 
to evaluate their uses in a perfectly competent manner. 
How do consumers react in an environment with a constant stream of innovations, and 
in which they are confronted by goods whose features they can only imperfectly know? The 
answer provided by the standard analyses of comparative statics is the following: as new 
goods enter the market, consumers develop new preference structures which were entirely 
unknown to them before these new goods appeared; on the basis of these new preferences, 
certain of these new goods are selected and are successful. It is not deemed important to study 
how new preferences are formed, the assumption being that it is a transitory and costless 
process. 
In reality, and in the Schumpeterian account, matters are rather different. Consumers 
possess neither complete information nor sufficient knowledge for perfectly competent 
decision-making. And nor do they individually possess sufficient resources with which to 
conduct exhaustive research on existing goods and their quality, and thereby mitigate their 
ignorance. 
This is a typical case of appraisal difficulty which exposes buyers to the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour. The price system is unable to transmit sufficient signals for 
consumers to be able to orient their choice (a consumer will not purchase a good offered by a 
producer at a lower-than-normal price unless he is able to ascertain that the quality of that 
good is at least equal to that of its competitor goods). Producers and consumers must therefore 
directly exchange the information about goods that the price system is unable to furnish. 
For reasons that I shall not examine here, in the real world there do not normally exist 
sufficient sources (newspapers, magazines, catalogues, etc.) of information which enable 
complete and detailed assessment of quality. That is to say, the market system is unable to 
generate internally to itself - unlike the used-car market - a new market, that of information 
about goods. Essentially, the emergence of this market is prevented by (a) the difficulties 
faced by experts in evaluating new goods, since they are ignorant of innovations which are 
protected by patent or may even be secret; (b) the fact that, whereas competition among sellers 
is virtuous, because it forces them to improve their expertise in sectors in which they are 
already specialists, to be 'experts' buyers must be knowledgeable about the whole range of 
goods on offer. Consequently, there cannot exist that powerful mechanism of competition 
which obliges consumers to conduct ever more accurate appraisals of the goods that they 
purchase. This is because, given the limited nature of their knowledge, they would have to 
undertake processes of learning and information-gathering on an enormous scale. Consumers 
are therefore forced to delegate appraisal to experts, to opinion leaders, or simply to rely on 
the word of the seller. 
The crucial point is that consumers lack not only information but also expertise. They 
are therefore obliged to accept external and 'pre-packaged' judgements and evaluations. This 
is the most insidious aspect of delegation, because i t  induces consumers to accept and 
internalize judgements and evaluations which have not been objectively elaborated and tested. 
The word "persuasion", indeed, signifies inducing others to accept one's assessments, and in 
an innovative context this means that the seller of a new good will seek to impose assessment 
criteria on potential buyers which work in his favour. 
The massive growth of the advertising sector in the course of this century clearly 
testifies to the crucial nature of information and of the persuasion of consumers by producers. 
Schumpeter highlights this phenomenon the second part of Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy. He points out that advertising does not merely convey information to a public 
perfectly able to discriminate and choose; it is intended to persuade. Firms do not restrict 
themselves to providing information. They augment their knowledge of the real or potential 
needs of consumers by conducting market surveys so that they can induce them to buy their 
products. 
Contrary to the neoclassical model, in which supply and demand are formed entirely 
independently of each other, in Schumpeter's view, therefore, the formation of demand is 
influenced by the mechanisms of persuasion deployed by producers. Although consumers 
possess decision-making autonomy, it  is restricted by the persuasive action of firms, which 
are able to orient buyers' choices by focusing their attention on specific products and by 
exaggerating their qualities. 
Schumpeter adopted a cautious position regarding the autonomy of the consumer; 
nevertheless it was a position directly at odds with traditional theory. He advanced the 
hypothesis that the cognitive and decisional autonomy of consumers is limited, and that its 
'range of action' depends on the opportunities available to them to appraise the quality of 
goods directly, on their familiarity with the goods that they intend to purchase. This provided 
Schumpeter with the link between his analyses of economic choice and of political choice. As 
we shall see, whereas he attributed a substantial amount of autonomy to consumers, given that 
they can personally and directly appraise the quality of goods, he attributed much less 
autonomy to electors when they must decide which party or candidate to support. 
In making this assertion, Schumpeter anticipated many of the conclusions reached thirty 
years later by cognitive psychology in its analysis of consumer behaviour. Empirical studies 
of consumption and decisions under conditions of uncertainty show that bounded rationality, 
attention focusing, cognitive frame dependence (see in general the works of Kahnemann and 
Tversky) play a systematic and crucial role in the formation of preferences. This provides 
strong a posteriori confirmation of the validity of Schumpeter's theory. 
However, in the 1940s, economists were entirely unaware of this line of analysis. The 
gulf between the experimental psychological study of consumer behaviour and the economic 
theory of consumption decisions was (except in the works of Katona) total. Schumpeter's 
analysis was therefore interpreted solely as an attempt to introduce realism into the description 
of economic facts, and its powerful innovative potential in the theoretical field was ignored. 
With the recent development of the theory of bounded rationality (Herbert Simon), and 
the consequent intellectual alliance between cognitive sciences, psychology and economics, it 
is now clear that Schumpeter's assumptions can be used to conduct a radical revision of the 
theory of consumption. If one assumes, in fact, that individuals act on the basis of limited 
rationality and competences, the consequence is that the formation of consumer choices and 
preferences is affected by external agents which provide or suggest the criteria for assessment: 
the expert, the opinion leader, or the producer exert a decisive influence on the collective 
formation of new systems of opinions and therefore of preferences. 
I do not consider this phenomenon -the fact that it is possible to create new needs 
"artificially", to "manipulate" consumer preferences - as intrinsically negative, for it is the 
inevitable consequence of the cognitive and rational limitations of human beings. All needs, 
with the exception of the most basic primary ones, are eminently cultural in nature 
(anthropological in the broad sense), and the incessant creation of new needs by competitive 
capitalism has undeniably increased the sum of human well-being. The fact that needs are 
'artificially' created and re-created has therefore had both positive and negative consequences 
for economic and civil progress. It all depends, of course, on the institutional framework 
within which the phenomenon unfolds, and of the level of awareness of those involved. One 
may choose to accept the assessments proposed by others; but this choice is freer, the more it 
is based on knowledge and awareness. This is the key component of Hirschman's (1984) 
analysis of changes in preferences. 
Hirschman draws on the approach developed by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt to 
distinguish between 'wanton' and non-wanton' changes in preferences. The former are 
simple, random and induced by fashion; the latter are deliberate, complex and the outcome of 
an often arduous process of introspection ('wanton', Hirschman reminds us, means 
L f r i ~ ~ l o ~ ~ ' ,  'vacuous' but also 'unpremeditated'). He proposes that the capacities attributed to 
an economic agent should also include an ability to make non-wanton choices; that is, the 
ability to reflect on previous choices and, if necessary, change the criteria on the basis of 
which these choices were made. 
The problem is establishing whether there are elements endogenous to the market which 
induce consumers to make non-wanton choices; that is, whether there are forces which prompt 
consumers to make competent and informed choices, although most appraisals must 
nonetheless be delegated because of the rational and cognitive limitations of human beings. 
Now, it is a commonplace experience that this is not what actually happens: systematic rivalry 
exists among competing firms. Firms do not have a common interest which induces them 
faithfully and impartially to inform consumers about the characteristics of their new products; 
on the contrary, it is in their interest to advertise their products and to persuade consumers that 
they are better than those of their competitors. 
Accordingly, and given the "cognitive laziness" of the mass of consumers, advertising 
techniques manipulate the unconscious and irrational elements that determine consumer 
choices. The advertiser who based his campaign on the rationality of choice and on the 
transparency and completeness of information would encounter serious problems with his 
client, and, by subjecting the consumer to high cognitive overload, he would probably fail to 
sell the product. 
The crucial point is that producers have no interest in providing consumers with the 
means to make a free, informed and conscious choice. On the contrary, the knowledge that a 
choice is 'wanton' substantially reduces the producer's uncertainty, because in this case the 
choice is subject to advertising and fashion, and therefore to a certain amount of control and 
influence exercised by the producer himself. This is exactly the opposite of what should be 
guaranteed to the consumer, namely the provision of every incentive to choose with the 
maximum amount of knowledge and competence. 
This phenomenon is a very subtle form of market failure. The market is blind, in the 
sense that it does not possess the power to force consumers to adopt entirely rational 
behaviour, to undertake 'virtuous' competition similar to the competition among producers. 
This may set a trap for the economic system as a whole, which becomes unable to force its 
components to express their needs and interests with a high degree of rationality. This 
phenomenon is driven by an element closely associated with the difficulty of appraisal 
analysed by Arrow: namely the fact that the transfer and modification of preferences is largely 
the result of exogenous factors. Schumpeter was fully aware of the great significance of this 
phenomenon - which lies at the basis of delegation mechanisms and therefore of the 
emergence of leadership - but, as we have seen, he believed it to be of limited importance in 
the economic field. By contrast, he argued that this phenomenon had a crucial impact in the 
political arena.7 
9. Democracy and Competition 
The above discussion of the limits of competition links directly with the last part of 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, which contains what was certainly Schumpeter's most 
innovative contribution to the history of thought. The aim of this section is not to conduct a 
critical reading of Schumpeter's views on democracy, but, more simply, to show how his 
original conception of human economic behaviour was naturally extended, in this part of his 
book, to social and political behaviour. 
Schumpeter suggests that the struggle for power is a process entirely analogous with the 
competition for profit. Democracy is therefore a system of rules ensuring that the contest for 
power takes the peaceful form of the political election. 
This analogy between market and democracy holds true because Schumpeter developed 
a set of postulates which enable political and economic behaviour to be treated in unitary 
fashion. 
Schumpeter's analysis was based on the following three principles: (i) the limited ability 
of individuals to reflect, to form independent opinions and to decide (an assumption of 
'Austrian' stamp, which was given its first thorough formulation in the modern theory of 
bounded rationality); (ii) the fact that evaluation of goods requires knowledge and expertise; 
(iii) the principle of delegation, which enables leaders to rise to power. Let us examine the 
connections among these three principles. 
Human cognitive difficulties and bounded rationality are of especial significance when 
one moves from the economic sphere to the world of politics. 
'However, when we move still further away from the private concerns of the family and the 
business office into those regions of national and international affairs that lack a direct and 
unmistakable link with those private concerns, individual volition, command of facts and 
method of inference soon cease to fulfil the requirements of the classical doctrine. What 
strikes me most of all and seems to me to be the core of the trouble is the fact that the sense 
of reality is so completely lost. [. . .] 
Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he 
enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily 
recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. 
His thinking becomes associative and affective.' (page 260 and 261) 
The phenomena of advertising and fashion, which as we have seen subtly pervade the 
economic system, find their maximum expression in politics. They are phenomena which 
render the criteria and motives for decision-making even less transparent, when they instead 
require rationality and expertise, and subject the citizen to the decisive influence of political 
groups and parties. These latter create opinions and ideas with which they persuade citizens to 
change their attitudes and criteria of choice. 
7See his brilliant exposition of the problem in Schumpeter 1942: 242-5 1. 
'The only point that matters here is that, Human Nature in Politics being what is, their are 
able to fashion and, within very wide limits, even to create the will of the people. What we 
are confronted with in the analysis is not a genuine but a manufactured will. And often this 
artefact is all that in reality corresponds to the volontt gCnCrale of the classical doctrine. So 
far as this is so, the will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the 
political process '(page 263) 
This position should not be interpreted as an Orwellian prophecy. Schumpeter 
realistically acknowledges that the degree of cognitive and decision-making autonomy of the 
'average' citizen as regards political choice is very low. Consequently, the chief problem is to 
establish whether there exist institutional mechanisms which exert a virtuous effect by 
enabling citizens to make their political assessments and choices in more rational manner. 
This may happen if the political institutions permit the leaders of new groups and parties 
to emerge, and if they ensure that conflictual political rivalry is resolved peacefully through 
elections. This for Schumpeter is the function of democracy: to guarantee the proper working 
of a process of political competition so that leaders enjoying broad consensus may assume 
power. 
Of course, operating in harness with the virtuous process of competition is adverse 
selection. In fact, the winners of the competitive struggle, those who manage on the basis of 
the rules of democracy to form majority coalitions, must fulfil their promises. But verifying 
that pledges have been maintained, using the power assigned to him to fulfil pre-announced 
plans, is very difficult for the average citizen. 
This evident difficulty also stems from the fact that the good promised to the citizen at 
the moment of voting is, by the very nature of things, extremely generic. The vote is in a 
certain sense a blank cheque issued on the basis of an extremely ill-defined agreement 
between voter and candidate. When the deal is struck, it is of sufficient vagueness to give the 
future leader broad margins of discretionality. 
Precisely because of the extremely generic definition given to the good, it is not possible 
to conduct fully rational appraisal of its nature and its consequences: the vote is therefore a 
radical act of delegation, and as such presupposes a high degree of trust in the potential leader. 
This is therefore a situation which faithfully replicates the mechanism of 'market failure' 
discussed in the case of the economic system. The good that the electors evaluate is a good for 
which neither appropriability not full and rational appraisability exist; it may therefore lead to 
the emergence of opportunistic behaviour. 
In previous sections I have argued - on the basis of the non-appraisability and the non- 
appropraibility of innovations - that the market is unable to develop into a fully self-regulated 
institution, but requires rules guaranteed by an external power - state power - if it is to 
maintain its competitive mechanisms. What happens in the case of the institutions of 
democracy? 
There is a distinct possibility that the world of politics dupes citizens, that voters are 
systematically sold 'lemons' by leaders who make vague promises, who make massive use of 
covert methods of persuasion, who substitute advertising for political debate. This, to continue 
with the analogy, induces citizens to withdraw from the electoral market; that is, participation 
dwindles to the point when democracy as an institution collapses. 
Are there remedies? If so, what are they? As in the market, so in democracy 
opportunistic behaviour can be disincentivated with the threat of loss of reputation, of the trust 
placed in the leader. The problem once again is whether there exist mechanisms which can 
bring this about. 
Schumpeter suggests - as we have seen - that adverse selection can be combatted by a 
system which ensures that groups and parties embracing different political positions emerge 
and can assume power by winning elections. If the competition is effective, leaders are 
provided with an incentive to keep their promises and to define their policies unambiguously. 
Since there nonetheless remains a broad margin of non-appraisability of the good, due to its 
very nature, the rise of institutions which enable citizens to form opinions on, and assessments 
of, the policies proposed by the leaders in the most informed manner possible is a key factor 
in the 'virtuous' working of political competition. The mass media may perform this function 
by furnishing information and evaluations, and by enabling the citizen to assess the leader's 
performance as a non-wanton good. However, as in the economic system, so in the political 
arena the markets of information and knowledge are not complete. 
10. Final Remarks 
With its conceptual unification of economic and political behaviour, Schumpeter's analysis 
warns us that virtuous selection and adverse selection are ever-present in the market and in 
politics. Democracy is therefore a vulnerable institution. The limitations of Schumpeter's 
analysis, as discussed in previous sections, do not vitiate the powerful thrust of his ideas, 
which even today have still to find full development. He suggests that cooperation and 
conflict in society are resolved by much more sophisticated and complex mechanisms than 
those denoted by the Smithian metaphor of the 'invisible hand'. It is not sufficient for 
everyone to pursue their interests for advantages to accrue - without those involved in the 
process being aware of it - to all other individuals and with the overall enhancement of the 
economy and society. There exist, as the consequence of the pursuit of individual interests, 
also perverse mechanisms. And since these mechanisms are not imposed from outside but are 
born of the limitations on human behaviour in the political and economic institutions, there is 
no guarantee that market and democracy will function in a virtuous manner. 
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